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1I. Introduction
High wage differences across countries constitute an important explanation for the
currently significant business practice of international outsourcing. These wage
differentials could lead to outsourcing (see e.g. Sinn (2007) for details, and Stefanova
(2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing). Glass and Saggi (2001)
have studied the causes of outsourcing and its effects and they found that higher
international outsourcing lowers the relative wage of domestic workers, while it
increases the profits and thereby creates greater incentives for innovation. We are not
aware of any existing study, which would have studied theoretically the employment
consequences of international outsourcing when workers are heterogeneous and one
skill-type is employed in a perfectly competitive market, and another in an imperfectly
competitive market. Therefore we assume that the low-skilled workers are unionized,
while the wage of the high-skilled workers adjusts to equilibrate the demand and supply
of their labour services.
In this study we analyze the effects of international outsourcing to low-wage
countries on equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers and labour demand in
high-wage countries characterized by heterogenous in-house workers in the dual labour
markets when there is both unionized and competitive determination of wages in the
home country. In terms of results we will show that the own wage elasticity, the cross
wage elasticity and the outsourcing elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend
positively on the amount of outsourcing, and it also depends positively on the payroll
tax, whereas the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing
elasticity for the high-skilled labour demand are independent of the amount of
outsourcing. In the presence of outsourcing the high-skilled wage formation by the
monopoly labour union depends negatively on the low-skilled wage and the payroll tax,
whereas the high-skilled wage is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters
under Cobb-Douglas utility function. In terms of low-skilled wage determination in the
presence of outsourcing a higher share of outsourced production and a higher
productivity of outsourced production will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour
and increase the wage for the high-skilled labour, thereby inducing higher wage
2dispersion. A higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled
labour and a higher low-skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled labour, while a higher payroll
tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and also under
reasonable assumptions decrease the wage for the high-skilled labour.
In terms of optimal committed outsourcing policy parameters affect as follows: a
higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and a higher unemployment benefit increase
optimal outsourcing, while a higher tax exemption, ceteris paribus, decreases optimal
outsourcing, and a higher payroll tax for the firms will have a positive effect on optimal
outsourcing under reasonable assumptions.
Finally, in terms of the effects of outsourcing and some policy variables on
equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers under alternative unemployment
benefit specifications we have the following results: A higher amount of outsourced
production will reduce equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers both in the
absence and presence of progressive wage taxation and proportional payroll taxation.
In the presence of outsourcing concerning the assumption that the direct effect of
tax parameters on wage formation dominates the indirect effect via outsourcing the
higher wage tax and the higher tax exemption will have an ambiguous effect on
equilibrium unemployment while the higher payroll tax will decrease equilibrium
unemployment when the benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and less than one. In the
absence of outsourcing the higher wage tax and the higher tax exemption will have a
positive effect on equilibrium unemployment, while the higher payroll tax will have no
effect. In the presence of outsourcing raising the wage tax and the tax exemption while
keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant, this higher degree of tax
progression will decrease the wage rate and labour demand of low-skilled workers. This
result is qualitatively similar in the absence of outsourcing.
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the time sequence of the decisions
regarding some policy issues associated with labour taxes, outsourcing, wage setting for
low-skilled workers and labour demand for high-skilled and low-skilled workers and
the wage setting for high-skilled workers. We study the segmented labour demand for
heterogenous labour force and wage formation of high-skilled workers due to market
3equilibrium under proportional payroll tax in section III. The focus on wage formation
by the monopoly labour union for low-skilled workers under linearly progressive wage
tax, levied on workers, and proportional payroll tax, levied on firms, is analyzed in
section IV. Section V explores how the optimal committed production mode from the
firms’ point of view in the presence of partly imperfectly competitive and segmented
labour market depends on various important policy variables. In section VI we explore
some policy issues concerning equilibrium unemployment and labour demand of low-
skilled domestic workers. Finally, we present comments in section VII.
II. Basic Framework
We analyze a model with heterogeneous workers and international outsourcing.
The production combines labour services by high-skilled workers and low-skilled
workers. Low-skilled labour services can be provided either by the firm’s own workers,
or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing.
Establishing international outsourcing is time-consuming, and reversing such decisions
is often costly. Therefore, we assume that the firms have to commit to outsourcing
before they hire domestic labour. Whether the firms or the government moves first, is
an open question, a priori. We assume that the government decides on taxation and
unemployment benefits before the firms decide on their international outsourcing.
There are two motivations for this. First of all, major overhauls of tax systems are
rather rare, and thus tax systems appear more stable than outsourcing decisions by
individual firms. Second, the tax parameters to which we assume the government to
commit could be viewed as an equilibrium outcome of a repeated game. Without
commitment on the government’s part, the tax parameters that the firms expect the
government to choose ex ante would simply correspond to what is optimal for the
government to choose ex post. The timing of event is depicted as Figure 1. The
government sets its policy at stage 1. At stage 2, the firms make irreversible investment
in outsourcing. At stage 3, conditional of policy choices by the government and the
outsourcing decisions by the firms, the labour union determines the wage for the low-
4skilled workers. When deciding on its wage demand, the monopoly union of each
industry takes into account how this affects the demand for labour by the firms. We
assume that there are many industries, so that each labour union represents only a small
fraction of the total labor force. At stage 4, firms decide on domestic employment. The
wages of the high-skilled labour adjust to equalize labour demand and labour supply.
stage 1             stage 2             stage 3                               stage 4
time
some policy    outsourcing wage formation of      high-skilled labour *H  and
issues              decision M      low-skilled wage Lw  low-skilled labour demand
*L
and
                                                                                    high-skilled labour supply
sH  and   high-skilled wage
Hw from
sHH ?*
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
The decisions in terms of these things at each stage are analyzed by using
backward induction. There are high-skilled and low-skilled workers and we assume that
high-skilled wage formation is determined by the equality of the high-skilled labour
demand and labour supply and the low-skilled formation is determined by the labour
union subject to labour demand.1 This timing structure seems plausible as a starting
point when the implementation of a production mode with outsourcing compared with
domestic labour demand and wage formation requires irreversible investment
concerning the establishment of a network of foreign supplies. Of course, the relative
timing of wage formation and outsourcing might in some few cases to be different in
certain circumstances, which would be relevant if the firms flexibly adjust their
1    This has also been analyzed a little bit in Lingens and Waelde (2006), but they have abstracted from
outsourcing issues.
5production mode, and decide whether to initiate foreign outsourcing after the domestic
low-skilled wage is determined.2
III.   High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labour Demand and Wage
Formation of High-Skilled Workers under Progressive Wage Tax
and Proportional Payroll Tax
III.1. High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labour Demand
At the last stage, the firm decides on the high-skilled labour demand H  and the
low-skilled labour demand L  in order to maximize the profit function, taking the
acquired amount of outsourcing, M , as given.
)(~~),,(
),(
MgLwHwMLHFMax LH
LH
???????? (1)
When deciding on its labour demand, each firm takes the gross wage for high-skilled
labour, )1(~ sww HH ?? , the gross wage for low-skilled labour, )1(~ sww LL ?? , and the
outsourced low-skilled labour input M as given, where s  is the proportional payroll tax
levied on the firm. Under outsourced production firms acquire the low-skilled labour
input at the factor price c , which is lower than the wage of domestic low-skilled
workers. In order to obtain M  units of outsourced low-skilled labour input firms have
to make irreversible investment 25.0)( cMMg ? with 0)(' ?? cMMg  and
0)('' ?? cMg  into the establishment of networks of suppliers in the relevant low-wage
country.
2         Skaksen (2004) has analyzed this case using a Cobb-Douglas production function applied only to a
homogenous domestic labour force. Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-
stage game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the labour union sets wages
before the firms decide on the degree of outsourcing. They have argued that under such flexible
outsourcing the cost of outsourcing has an ambiguous effect on the wage set by the labour union.
6We follow Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) and assume a general and reasonable
Cobb-Douglas-type production function with the decreasing returns to scale according
to ? ??? aa MLHMLHF ??? 1)(),,( , where the parameters ?  and a  are assumed to
satisfy: 10 ?? ?  and 1
2
1 ?? a . This latter specification means that the marginal
productivity of the high-skilled labour is higher than that of the low-skilled labour. The
parameter 0??  captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input
relative to the domestic low-skilled labour input. The marginal products of high-skilled
and low-skilled labour are aaH MLaHXF
??? ?? 111 )( ?? ?  and
aa
L MLaHXF
?? ??? ))(1(1 ?? ? , respectively, where aa MLHX ??? 1)( ? . The
outsourced low-skilled labour input affects the marginal products of the domestic high-
skilled and low-skilled labour inputs after calculations as follows:
0)()1(112 ???? ??? aaHM MLaaHXF ???
?                                                     (2a)
? ? 0)1(1)()1( 11 ??????? ??? aMLaHXF aaLM ???? ? (2b)
Thus, for this production function the domestic high-skilled labour input and the
outsourced low-skilled labour input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic
labour input and the outsourced low-skilled labour input are substitutes in terms of the
marginal product effects of outsourcing. Also one can calculate in the similar way that
the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour from ? ??? aa MLHMLHF ??? 1)(),,(
are complements, i.e. 0?HLF . Given both the outsourcing decision and the wages the
first-order conditions characterizing the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour
demands are
? ? 0~)()( 1111 ????? ???? HaaaaH wMLaHMLH ???? ? (3a)
? ? 0~)()1()( 11 ?????? ??? LaaaaL wMLHaMLH ???? ?  .           (3b)
7These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-skilled
labour ( H ) and the low-skilled labour inclusive of outsourcing ( ML ?? )
)(
1
ML
a
a
w
wH
H
L ??
?
? . (4)
Substituting (4) into (3b) gives (see Appendix A) the low-skilled labour demand, which
can be expressed as follows
MswmwL
L
H
L
L
HL ?
??? ??? ??? )1(*  ,                                      (5)
where ? ? 0)1( 1 11 ??? ?? ???? aa aam , 1
1
1 ?
?
????
?
?? a
L
wL LwL
L
L  denotes the own wage
elasticity of the low-skilled labour and 0
1
?
?
???
?
?? a
L
wL HwL
H
H  denotes the cross
wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour with respect to the high-skilled wage in the
absence of outsourcing, when 0?M .3 These elasticities are higher with weaker
decreasing returns to scale. Higher own wage and cross wage will affect negatively the
low-skilled labour demand. In the absence of outsourcing the payroll tax elasticity of
the low-skilled labour is 1
1
1)1(
?
?
?
?
???
?
??
L
sLsL
s  because of the decreasing
returns to scale. According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease
the low-skilled labour demand. This feature is consistent with empirical evidence.4
In the presence of outsourcing M  the wage elasticities of the low-skilled labour,
0
*
*
?
?
M
Lw
L
wL
L  and
0
*
*
?
?
M
Hw
L
wL
H , can be written as follows
?
?
?
?
?
? ?? *1ˆ L
ML
L
L
L ???                   (6a)
and
3      In the presence of perfect substitutability between two types of labour inputs, i.e. between L  and
M , we would have 1?? , but it is important to mention that qualitative results are similar.
4       For instance Diehl (1999) has presented empirical evidence from German manufacturing
industries in support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level
data of the Irish electronic sector to empirically conclude that international outsourcing reduces
plan-level labour demand.
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so that 0ˆ)1(
ˆ
***2*
**
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?
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?
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?
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L
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L
L
L
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M
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M
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ˆ
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?????
?
?
?
?
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?
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H
L
H
ML
H
L
H
LL
M
LL
MLL
M
???????? . These are in conformity with
empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage elasticity
of low-skilled labour demand.5
Moreover, the elasticity of low-skilled labour with respect to outsourcing is
positive, i.e. ? ? 0*
*
?
?
???
?? Mwmw
M
L
ML
L
H
L
L
HL
ML
M
?
??
??
. Differentiating this with respect to
M  gives
? ? 0)1(
)(
**2*
*
2 ???
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
L
M
LL
ML
Mwmw
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M LHLL
L
H
L
L
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L
M ????
?
??
??
??
.               (7)
which means that higher outsourcing will increase the outsourcing elasticity of the low-
skilled labour. Differentiating (6a) with respect to the payroll tax gives
0ˆ
)1(
)1(
)1(
ˆ
***2*
*
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
? L
L
L
LsL
L
L
L
L
M
sL
M
L
M
sL
ML
s
??????????                  (8)
according to which the payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing will have a positive
effect of the wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour demand. Of course there is no
wage elasticity effect of payroll tax in the absence of outsourcing, i.e. 0
ˆ
0
?
?
?
?M
L
L
s
? . In
5        Senses (2006) has provided empirical evidence according to which a production mode with more
outsourcing seems to increase the wage elasticity of labour demand. Also Slaughter (2001) and
Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2007) have shown in terms of empirics that international trade has
increased the wage elasticity of labour demand.
9the presence of outsourcing the payroll tax elasticity of the low-skilled labour,
0
*
* )1(
?
?
?
M
s
L
sL , is
?
?
?
?
?
? ?? *1ˆ L
M???                                                                                       (9)
where 1
1
1
?
?
??
?
?? Ls  so that higher outsourcing raises this elasticity as well, i.e.
0ˆ)1(
ˆ
*** ?????
? ??????
LL
M
LM
.
Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (5) into the relationship between the
high-skilled and low-skilled labour presented in equation (4) gives the following
optimal demand for the high-skilled labour
??? ??? ?
?
? )1(
1
* sww
a
maH
H
L
H
H
LH ,                                                       (10)
where 1
1
)1(1
*
*
?
?
?????
?
?? a
H
wH HwH
H
H , 0
1
)1(
*
*
?
?
????
?
?? a
H
wH LwH
L
L and
1
1
1)1(
*
*
?
?
?
?
???
?
??
H
sH sH
s . These elasticities are also higher with weaker
decreasing returns to scale, but unlike the case with the low-skilled labour, both the
own wage and cross wage labor demand elasticities, and the payroll tax elasticity for
high-skilled labour are independent of outsourcing. Higher own wage, cross wage and
payroll tax will affect negatively the high-skilled labour demand.
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the domestic
demand for labour in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 1 In the presence of outsourcing
(a) the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing
elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the
amount of outsourcing, and they also depend positively on the payroll tax,
whereas
10
(b) the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing
elasticity for the high-skilled labour demand are independent of the
amount of outsourcing and the payroll tax.
Proposition 1 reveals an asymmetry in how the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled
labor react to the amount of outsourcing and the level of payroll taxes. An increase in
outsourcing or payroll taxes would increase the own wage elasticity, the cross wage
elasticity and the outsourcing elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand, while having
no effect on the elasticities for the high-skilled labour demand.
III.2.  Wage Formation for High-Skilled Workers in the Presence of Progressive
Wage Tax and Proportional Payroll Tax
III.2.1 Optimal Labour Supply of High-Skilled Workers
We assume that the market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw  follows
from the equality of labour demand and the labour supply in the case of Cobb-Douglas
utility function, where the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is
one. First we derive labour supply and after that the wage formation from market
equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage Lw  as given.
We assume that government can employ the proportional wage tax Ht  for high-
skilled worker, which is levied on the wage rate Hw  minus tax exemption e . Thus the
total tax base in this case is HewH )( ? , where H  is labour supply. In the presence of
positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate
)/1( HH wet ?  so that the system is linearly progressive.
6 The net-of-tax wage, the high-
skilled worker receives, is etwtw HHHH ??? )1(ˆ .
We assume that labour supply of the high-skilled worker is determined by utility
maximization. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function the elasticity of
6     For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).
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substitution is equal to one in terms of consumption C  and leisure H?1 in the utility
function, i.e. ?? ??? 1)1(),( HCHCU , 10 ?? ? . Maximizing ?? ??? 1)1(),( HCHCU
s.t. CHwH ?ˆ  with respect to labour supply H  gives
0)1()ˆ)(1()1()ˆ( 11 ?????? ??? ???? ?? HHwHHwU HHH  so that
??sH                                                                                            (11)
Therefore under this assumption the net-of-tax wage etwtw HHHH ??? )1(ˆ  will
have no effect on labour supply when the substitution and income effects of wage rate
cancel each other. It is important to emphasize that a central findings in the empirical
labour market literature is that labour supply tends to be quite unresponsive along the
intensive margin (see for empirical evidence, e.g. Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez
(2007) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). Therefore, we would like to focus on this
finding concerning the market equilibrium of high-skilled workers.
III.2.2 Market Equilibrium for High-Skilled Wage Formation
Unlike in the case of low-skilled workers we assume that the high-skilled wage
Hw  is determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the labour
demand function and the labour supply function. In the case of C-D utility function the
equality sHH ?*  gives ??
?
?? ??
?
?
?? HH
H
L
H
H sww
a
ma
LH )1(1
 , which can be expressed as
H
H
H
H
H
LH
H sw
ma
aw LH
?
?
?
?
?? ??? ???
?
??
? ?? )1()1(
1
                                                (12)
where 0
)1(1
)1(/ ?
??
??
a
aH
H
H
L ?
???  and 1
)1(1
1/ ?
??
?
a
H
H ?
?? . The comparative statics
in terms of Hw  and Lw  is
0)1()1(
1
1
??????
?
??
? ???
?
? ????
L
H
H
H
H
L
LH
H
H
L
L
H
w
wsw
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a
w
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H
H
H
H
LH
H
?
??
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
.             (13)
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Equation (13) lies in conformity with empirics concerning the negative relationship
between high-skilled and low-skilled wages. It has been empirically shown that higher
outsourcing will decrease wage formation of low-skilled workers and increase wage
formation of high-skilled workers, i.e. that wage dispersion will increase7
The effect of payroll tax on wage formation of high-skilled workers is under our
utility assumption
0
1
)1()1(
1
1
?
?
?????
?
??
? ???
?
? ????
s
wsw
ma
a
s
w H
H
H
LH
H
H HH
H
H
H
LH
H
?
??
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
              (14)
so that higher payroll tax will decrease the wage rate of high-skilled workers because it
decreases labour demand in the case of fixed labour supply (concerning empirical
evidence, see. e.g. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), and Bingley and Lanot (2002)).
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the high-skilled
wage determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 2 In the presence of outsourcing
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively  on the low-skilled wage and  the
payroll tax, whereas
(b) the high-skilled wage is independent of the high-skilled wage tax
parameters in the case of high-skilled workers’ Cobb-Douglas utility
function.
In the first sight, it may appear surprising that the high-skilled wage reacts negatively to
the low-skilled wage tax, but is independent of their own wage tax. The intuition for
this relies on our assumption that the high-skilled workers have a C-D utility function.
7         See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel
(2007), Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger
and Egger (2006), Munch and Skaksen (2005), Yan (2006), Riley and Young (2007) and
Geishecker and Görg (2008)
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With it, income and substitution effects of a tax increase on the labor supply cancel
each other out.
IV. Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union for Low-Skilled
Workers in the Presence of Progressive Wage Taxation and
Proportional Payroll Taxation
Now we analyze the wage formation of low-skilled workers and continue to
consider the acquired amount of outsourcing, M  as given. We analyze the wage
formation by the labour monopoly union, which determines the wage for low-skilled
workers in anticipation of optimal in-house low-skilled labour demand and of market
equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw . In western European countries, which we
like to focus labour market institutions are closed to this than in other countries (see e.g.
Freeman (2008), see also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403 concerning the
monopoly trade union specification).
IV.1. Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union
We investigate the wage formation by monopoly labour union when there is
proportional payroll tax, and the linearly progressive wage tax for low-skilled workers.
The market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw  follows from the equality of
labour demand and the labour supply by focusing the case of C-D utility function. The
monopoly labour union determines the wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of
optimal in-house employment decisions by the firm. We assume that government can
employ a proportional tax rate Lt , which is levied on the wage rate Lw  minus a tax
exemption e . Thus the total tax base in this case is *)( LewL? . In the presence of a
positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate
)/1( LL wet ?  so that the system is linearly progressive. The net-of-tax wage is
etwtw LLLL ??? )1(ˆ .
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 The objective function of the labour union is assumed to be
NbLbwNbLbetwtV LLLLLLLL ????????
** )ˆ())1(( , where Lb  is the (exogenous)
outside option available to the low-skilled workers and N is the number of labour union
members. Given the amount of outsourcing, the monopoly labour union sets wage both
for the low-skilled workers so as to maximize the surplus according to
? NbLbwV LLL
wL
??? *
)(
)ˆ(max  s.t. 0?L?  and
sHH ?*                                   (15)
where in the presence of payroll tax ??? ??? ?
?
? )1(
1
* sww
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H
LH  and ??
sH , which
implies
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? ?? )1()1(
1
  (see equations (10), (11) and (12)).
The first-order condition associated with (15) is
.))1(()1(0 *
*
*
**
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?????????
H
L
L
HHwLw
LLLLLL
L
w w
w
w
w
L
wL
L
wL
betwtwt
w
LV HL
L
 (16)
This can be written as follows
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where the own wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand is ?
?
?
?
?
? ?? *1ˆ L
ML
L
L
L
???  and
the cross wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand is ?
?
?
?
?
? ?? *1ˆ L
ML
H
L
H
??? . These are
not constant because  the low-skilled labour demand, MswwmL
L
H
L
L
HL ?
??? ??? ??? )1(*
depends negatively on the following variables: the high-skilled wage, the low-skilled
wage, outsourcing, the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative
to the domestic low-skilled labour input, and the payroll tax. Equation (17) can be
expressed as follows
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where the total wage elasticity allowing for the relationship between high-skilled and
low-skilled wages is 1)1( * ??? L
ML
L ??? , )1(1
1
a??
?
?
? . It is important to
emphasize that the optimal low-skilled wage (19) even for the monopoly labour union
is an implicit form in the presence of outsourcing, because the numerator and
denominator of the mark-up
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)(  depends on the low-skilled wage rate
in a non-linear way. It cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic low-skilled
wage.
IV.2. Comparative Statics of Wage Formation
In order to characterize the effect of outsourcing on the low-skilled wage
formation we therefore apply the implicit differentiation. Differentiating the wage
formation (19) with respect to low-skilled wage and outsourcing gives
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so that higher outsourcing will decrease the wage of low-skilled workers. This lies in
conformity with empirics, which we have already mentioned earlier.
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (19) with respect to the productivity
of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic low-skilled labour
input and low-skilled wage formation gives
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which can be expressed also by using L
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outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic low-skilled labour input
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will have a wage moderating effect concerning low-skilled workers’ wage. Moreover,
and importantly, equations (21) and (23) jointly with equation (13) imply 0
*
?
dM
dwH  and
0
*
?
?d
dwH  so that higher outsourcing and higher productivity of the outsourced low-
skilled labour input will have positive effects on the domestic high-skilled labour wage.
In terms of comparative statics of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option we
have (see Appendix B)
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According to (24a-24c) the effects of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option for
unemployment benefit on low-skilled wage formation are qualitatively the same with
and without outsourcing because 0
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absence of outsourcing the mark-up between outside option and wage formation is
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? , which is higher than in the presence of outsourcing.
Therefore the effects of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option for unemployment
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benefit are smaller in the presence of international outsourcing. Therefore, equations
(24a-c) imply jointly with equation (13) that ,0
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dw .
Finally, differentiating the implicit wage formation (19) with respect to the wage
of low-skilled workers and the payroll tax gives
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which can be expressed as follows
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have a wage moderating effect concerning the low-skilled workers’ wage, because the
payroll tax will have a positive effect on the wage elasticity. But in the absence of
outsourcing it will have no effect because 0
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The total effect of the payroll tax on the high-skilled workers’ wage is the
following
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and using equations (13), (14) and (26) this can be expressed as
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which is also negative because 0))1(()1( * ????? ML HL
L
L ????? , where
01)1( ???????? LL
L
L
H
L
L
L
H
L
L
L ????????? .
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage formation
in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 3 In the presence of outsourcing
(a)  the higher share of outsourced production and a higher productivity of
outsourced production will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour
and increase the wage for the high-skilled labour, thereby inducing higher
wage dispersion, and
(b) the higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and a higher low-
skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled
labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour, and these
qualitative results are also similar but higher in the absence of
outsourcing, and
(c) the higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled and high-skilled labour. In the absence of outsourcing, a higher
payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labour,
but has no effect on the wage of low-skilled labour.
The first part of Proposition 3 reveals political economy considerations related to
outsourcing and taxation. An increased outsourcing benefits high-skilled workers, but
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hurts low-skilled workers. Such a result is perfectly in line with the fact that the
outsourced input is a substitute to the low-skilled labor, and a complement to high-
skilled labor. Nonetheless, the conventional analysis has focused on competitive labour
markets.
The second part of Proposition 3 reports that the qualitative effects of wage taxes
and tax exemption for the low-skilled workers are not changed by outsourcing. A
higher wage tax for the low-skilled labour will encourage labour unions to increase
their wage demand, which pushes for higher low-skilled unemployment and lower
high-skilled wages. A higher tax exemption for the low-skilled, on the other hand,
reduces the wage demand by the labour union. This, in turn, results in a lower
unemployment for the low-skilled, and increases the wages for the high-skilled.
The third part of Proposition 3 reveals that outsourcing may change qualitatively
how wage demands by labour unions respond to payroll taxes. In the absence of
outsourcing, a higher payroll tax has no effect on the wage of low-skilled labour that
the labour unions set. With outsourcing, labour unions cut their wage demand when the
payroll tax is increased. The wage for the high-skilled is decreasing in the payroll tax
rate, both with and without outsourcing.
V.  Optimal Committed Outsourcing Before Wage Formation and
Domestic Labour Demand
We now turn to explore the stage, where the firm commits itself to the
outsourcing activity M  prior to the determination of wages and domestic employment.
We characterize how the labour market imperfection and tax parameters affect the
equilibrium production mode. It is assumed that the long-run production mode decision
internalizes the effect of the share of outsourced production on the low-skilled wage
and also on the high-skilled wage in different directions.
The firm determines the magnitude of outsourcing so as to maximize its profit. It
is assumed that the firm has rational expectations regarding the subsequent outcomes
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with respect to the high-skilled and low-skilled wage and employment so that the
production mode internalizes the effects of the share of outsourced production on
wages and employment. The production mode is determined by the following
optimization problem in the presence of linearly progressive wage taxation and
proportional payroll taxation
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By applying the envelope theorem we get the following first-order condition for
the optimal amount of committed outsourcing associated with the optimization problem
(29) by taking tax parameters as given8
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Hence, in addition to the direct marginal cost cM  and the direct marginal profit MF
introducing outsourcing will decrease the wage cost of the domestic low-skilled labour,
8         Outsourcing does not have a direct effect on the high-skilled wage, but only via the effect of low-
skilled wage, see equation (12).
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because these are substitutes, but will increase the market equilibrium wage cost of
domestic high-skilled labour, because these are complements. Therefore, according to
(30) the presence of domestic labour market imperfection increases the returns from
outsourcing because it has an aggregate wage-moderating effect, but also decreases the
returns due to wage increasing effect of high-skilled labour.9
By using equations (21) and (31b) we have
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Incorporating (31a), (32a) and (32b) into the first-order condition (30) we can now re-
express it in the following way (see Appendix C)
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Now we analyze the effects of wage tax, tax exemption, unemployment benefit as
well as the effect of payroll tax on the optimal outsourcing. Using the notation
XML LL ???? ???? )1()1(
* the second-order condition is
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9       This lies in conformity with empirics, see e.g. Braun and Scheffel (2007), Egger and Egger
(2006), Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Geishecker and Görg
(2008), Hijzen (2007), Munch and Skaksen (2005)  and Yan (2006).
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In terms of the wage tax rate Lt the first-order condition (33) changes as
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In terms of tax exemption and higher unemployment benefit we will get in the similar
way the following results: By using the cross-derivative for tax exemption
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(see equations (24a-24c)  concerning
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dw* ,
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 and
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dw* ). Therefore, both higher
domestic low-skilled wage tax and higher unemployment benefit increase optimal
outsourcing, while higher tax exemption, ceteris paribus, decreases optimal
outsourcing, when we have also allowed the effects of these policy parameters via the
wage of the high-skilled workers.
In terms of payroll tax rate s  the first-order condition (33) will change in the
more complicated way via three different aspects in the following way
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which can be expressed as follows (see Appendix C)
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This is positive, if
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Under reasonable assumptions this is the case. In this case higher payroll tax increases
optimal outsourcing.
We can now summarize our findings in terms of optimal outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 4 Optimal committed outsourcing will affect by the policy
parameters as follows
(a)  the higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and a higher unemployment
benefit increases optimal outsourcing, while a higher tax exemption,
ceteris paribus, decreases optimal outsourcing, whereas
(b) the higher payroll tax for the firms under reasonable assumptions
increases optimal outsourcing.
Proposition 4 reports that in the presence of outsourcing, higher marginal tax on the
low-skilled workers tends to increase optimal outsourcing. The same holds for a higher
unemployment benefit, while higher tax exemption on the low-skilled labour decreases
outsourcing. The intuition for these results is the following: In the absence of a change
in outsourcing, higher marginal tax rate, higher unemployment benefit, or lower tax
exemption would each encourage the labor union to increase its wage demand. This
would, in turn, increase the optimal level of outsourcing. Anticipating the policy
response by the labour unions, firms increase the amount of outsourcing. If payroll tax
changes, it is reasonably the optimal response of the labour union.
VI. Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment by Low-Skilled
Workers
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VI.1. Outsourcing and Equilibrium Unemployment
We now move on to explore the determinants of equilibrium unemployment of
low-skilled workers in dual labour markets, when there is both unionized and
competitive determination of wages in the home country. First we analyze the effect of
outsourcing given labour tax parameters and second we study the effects of labour
taxation parameters on equilibrium unemployment both via wage and outsourcing
changes. According to (19) the wage formation for low-skilled workers in industry i  is
of the form LL bAw ˆ
* ? ,  where
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is, in principle, industry-specific. In a general equilibrium the term Lb  should be re-
interpreted as the endogenous outside option, which we specify in a conventional way
as
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where Lu is the unemployment rate, Lb  captures the unemployment benefit and Lw
denotes the wage formation in all identical industries (see e.g. Nickell and Layard
(1999), p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion). Assuming a constant benefit-
replacement ratio 1/0 * ??? LL wbq  so that by using (42) we have
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replacement ratio */ LL wbq ?  the impact of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment
under both progressive wage labour taxation and proportional payroll labour taxation
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where  outsourcing will have both the direct negative effect and the indirect positive
effect via the wage on the mark-up, but the direct effect dominates as
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wage taxation and proportional payroll taxation will decrease equilibrium
unemployment when the benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and less than one.
We can now summarize this finding as.
Proposition 5: A production mode with a higher amount of outsourced
production, ceteris paribus, will reduce equilibrium unemployment of low-
skilled workers both in the presence and in the absence of progressive wage
taxation and proportional payroll taxation.
Proposition 5 reports very importantly the negative relationship between outsourcing
and equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers, i.e. only concerning the
relationship between higher wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand and
outsourcing, which leads to wage moderation of low-skilled workers and thereby
smaller unemployment. Of course if there would be wage rigidity, then higher
outsourcing would increase unemployment due to a decrease in domestic low-skilled
labour demand.
VI.2. Labour Tax Instruments and Equilibrium Unemployment
Next we analyze the effect of labour tax parameters on equilibrium
unemployment of low-skilled workers. According to Proposition 4 higher domestic
low-skilled wage tax and lower wage tax exemption increases optimal outsourcing, and
low-skilled wage tax and lower wage tax exemption increases optimal outsourcing, and
higher payroll tax also affects outsourcing positively under reasonable assumptions.
Concerning labour tax parameters following the time sequence of decisions,
presented in Figure 1, the total wage effects of tax policy instruments consists both of
the direct effects and of the indirect effects via the impact these instruments have on the
strategic outsourcing decision of firms and thereby also on the wage rate.  The total
effect of the wage tax is
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dw *** . The direct wage effect is positive, and
29
the indirect effect via outsourcing is negative, because the wage tax makes outsourcing
more attractive which lowers the benefit of the wage increase for the monopoly labour
union. By using equations (21), (24a) and (37) we can rewrite it as follows
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In what follows we assume that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, which is
a reasonable assumption. We make the same assumption also in the case of tax
exemption e  and payroll tax s .
By differentiating the mark-up of (43) in terms of wage tax Lt  which gives via
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and (43) gives ?
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qdt
du  so that higher wage tax in the presence of
outsourcing will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment when the
benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and less than one. This is because the total effect of
higher wage tax on wage of low-skilled workers is negative and thereby increases the
wage elasticity and lowers the mark-up because of lower labour demand and higher
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outsourcing. But there is also the positive direct effect of wage tax on G  due to
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will also have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment. This is because the
total effect of higher tax exemption on wage of low-skilled workers is positive and
thereby decreases the wage elasticity and raises mark-up because of higher labour
demand and lower outsourcing. But there is also the negative effect of tax exemption on
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(see Appendix C). Therefore by combining (48) and (43) gives 0
1
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that higher payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing will decrease equilibrium
unemployment because it will decrease the wage of low-skilled workers both directly
and indirectly via higher outsourcing and thereby it increases the wage elasticity and
decreases the mark-up via
)( *
*
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?? ?
 .
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the effect of tax parameters as
follows.
Proposition 6: In the presence of outsourcing when the benefit-replacement
ratio is fixed and less than one and concerning the assumption that the direct
effects of tax parameters on wage formation dominate the indirect effect via
outsourcing
(a) the higher wage tax and the higher tax exemption will have an ambiguous
effect on equilibrium unemployment, while
(b) the higher payroll tax will decrease equilibrium unemployment because it
will decrease the wage of low-skilled workers and increase the wage
elasticity and thereby decreases the mark-up.
Ambiguity associated with workers’ taxation parameters is due to the facts that the total
effect of higher wage tax (tax exemption) on wage of low-skilled workers is negative
(positive) so that wage elasticity increases (decreases) and the mark-up lowers (raises),
but there is also the positive (negative) direct effects of parameters. In the absence of
outsourcing we 0
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dG . Therefore, the effects tax parameters are different in the presence of
absence of outsourcing, i.e. we have
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 Corollary: In the absence of outsourcing
(a) the higher wage tax and the higher tax exemption will have a positive
effect on equilibrium unemployment, while
(b) the higher payroll tax will have no effect.
VI.3. Higher Degree of Tax Progression and the Low-Skilled Labour Demand
Finally, we analyze the effect of wage tax progression on wage formation by the
low-skilled workers and labour demand. We assume that the tax reform will keep the
relative tax burden per low-skilled worker constant, i.e. this means
R
w
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The government can raise the degree of tax progression when it increases Lt  and e such
that 0?dR . Formally we have by using equations (37) and (38)
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where 1??
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so that a higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker
constant, will decrease the low-skilled wage rate both in the presence and absence of
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outsourcing (when 0?B ). Finally, we characterize the low-skilled employment effect
of this tax reform. By raising tax progression according to (50) we have
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** )1(*  so that the first term indicates
the effect on the wage rate on los-skilled labour demand and the second term indicates
the induced outsourcing. Dividing this by Ldt and substituting the RHS of (50) for
Ldtde /  gives after calculations (see Appendix D)
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so that a higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker
constant, will increase the low-skilled labour demand both in the presence and absence
of outsourcing (when the second term is zero).
We can now summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 7: In the presence of outsourcing raising the wage tax and the tax
exemption to keep the relative tax burden per worker constant, this higher degree of
tax progression will decrease the wage rate and labour demand of low-skilled
workers both in the presence and absence of outsourcing.
VII. Conclusions
We have studied some new issues in the presence of international outsourcing and
heterogeneous workers in the dual domestic labour markets when there is both
unionized determination of wages of low-skilled workers and competitive
determination of wages of high-skilled workers in the home country.
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We have shown that the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the
outsourcing elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the
amount of outsourcing, and it also depends positively on the payroll tax, whereas the
own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing elasticity for the
high-skilled labour demand are independent of the amount of outsourcing and the
payroll tax. In the presence of outsourcing the high-skilled wage formation by the
monopoly labour union depends negatively on the low-skilled wage and the payroll tax,
whereas the high-skilled wage is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters.
In terms of low-skilled wage determination in  the presence of outsourcing  a higher
share of outsourced production and a higher productivity of outsourced production will
decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour  and increase the wage for the high-skilled
labour, thereby inducing higher  wage dispersion, and a higher low-skilled wage tax
will increase the wage for the low-skilled labour and a higher low-skilled wage tax
exemption firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and increase the
wage for the high-skilled labour, while a higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease
the wage for the low-skilled labour and also under reasonable assumptions decrease the
wage for the high-skilled labour.
In terms of optimal committed outsourcing it will affect by the policy parameters
as follows: a higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and a higher unemployment benefit
increases optimal outsourcing, while a higher tax exemption, ceteris paribus, decreases
optimal outsourcing, whereas a higher payroll tax for the firms will have an ambiguous
effect on optimal outsourcing.
Finally, in terms of the effects of outsourcing and some policy variables on
equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers under alternative unemployment
benefit specifications we have the following results: A production mode with a higher
amount of outsourced production will reduce equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled
workers both in the absence and presence of progressive wage taxation and
proportional payroll taxation. In the presence of outsourcing concerning the assumption
that the direct effect of tax parameters on wage formation dominates the indirect effect
via outsourcing the higher wage tax and the higher tax exemption will have an
ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment while the higher payroll tax will
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decrease equilibrium unemployment when the benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and
less than one. In the absence of outsourcing the higher wage tax and the higher tax
exemption will have a positive effect on equilibrium unemployment, while the higher
payroll tax will have no effect. In the presence of outsourcing raising the wage tax and
the tax exemption while keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant, this higher
degree of tax progression will decrease the wage rate and labour demand of low-skilled
workers. This result is qualitatively similar in the absence of outsourcing.
There are several new research topics associated with these issues. We have
focused on the case where firms decide outsourcing before wage formation. But
sometimes firms may be flexible to decide outsourcing activity after wage is set by the
labour union. Other important issue is to study empirically the implications of labour
taxation and labour tax reforms on optimal outsourcing. Finally, it is also important to
do numerical simulations by checking the precise role of size of various parameters.
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Appendix A: Optimal Low-Skilled Labour Demand
Substituting the RHS of (4) for H  into (3b) gives
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(A3) in its turn gives (5). QED.
Appendix B: Optimal Wage Setting under Progressive Wage Taxation
and Proportional Payroll Taxation
The first-order condition associated with? LbetwtV LLLL
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where the own wage elasticity of labour demand is ?
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Differentiating (19) in terms of low-skilled wage and wage tax rate gives
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which gives (24a). Equations (24b) and (24c) can be derived in the similar way. QED.
Appendix C: Optimal Committed Outsourcing Before Wage
Formation and Domestic Labour Demand
By using (31a), (32a) and (32b) the first-order condition (30) can be re-expressed as
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Using equation (4) we have )(
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Using (C3a) and (C3b) makes it possible to rewrite (C1) as equation (33). Concerning
equation (36) one term in its numerator can be expressed as follows
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Concerning the payroll tax by using equation (26) we can rewrite one term in (40) as
follows
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which gives (40’). Concerning (48) using this gives 0)( *
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This gives (48). QED.
Appendix D: Tax Progression and Los-Skilled Labour Demand
Substituting the RHS of (50) for Ldtde /  into ?
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which gives (51), where the denominator is positive. Concerning
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which gives (52). QED.
